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	ACTION	INFO
1. D/OCA		X
2. DD/Legislation		X
3. DD/Senate Affairs		X
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5. DD/House Affairs		X
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7. Admin Officer		
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SUSPENSE

10 JAN 89

Date

Action Officer:

Remarks:

*Briefing Denied, per
letter to GAO, on 2 Feb '89*

by

- See MFR -

OCA 0335-89

GAH 3 JAN 89

Name/Date

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GAOUnited States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

ER 88-4782

Program Evaluation and
Methodology Division

December 22, 1988

Mr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Dear Mr. Gates:

John McMahon told me yesterday over the phone that you would be willing to arrange a briefing for my staff and me on CIA views of low-intensity warfare. This is a subject that has long interested me in that it poses some important questions about the role of technology and especially of technology transfer. At present, we (the Program Evaluation and Methodology Division of GAO) have been requested by Chairman Brooks of the House Government Operations Committee simply to study the nature of low-intensity warfare as faced by the U.S. Armed Forces in recent times.

What we need essentially from our CIA briefing is to get your agency's perspective on a number of questions, including the following:

- What is the CIA's assessment of the threat to the U.S. posed by low-intensity warfare?
- For what elements of the threat does the CIA see the need for a weapons technology response?
- In your view, what are the changes that have occurred in the level of weapons technology available to meet the threat, and what predictions would you make about the future?
- What weapons, weapons technologies, environments, and missions do you feel U.S. forces are most likely to have to face?
- What do you see as needed requirements to meet the threat? What types of intelligence are needed?
- What in your view are the elements (technological and/or non-technological) of a successful strategy for meeting the threat?


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with doing this.
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Thank you very much for agreeing to talk with us on this issue. I think it is critical for the CIA's views to be represented in our study.

With kind regards,

STAT

Sincerely yours,



Eleanor Chelimsky
Assistant Comptroller General

cc: Mr. McMahon

Call GAO -
set up mtg -
at Hqs with
Deputy Sec Def
then reference
for briefing
Jan 23, 1000 AM

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PREPARED QUESTIONS FOR CIA

Below are the specific questions that GAO/PEMD seeks to be answered in its low intensity conflict briefing with the CIA. This briefing was requested by GAO's letter of December 22 to Deputy Director Gates (see attached). The questions that follow are organized under the separate headings of the six questions contained in GAO's letter. We would appreciate receiving copies of any CIA documents (at the secret level or below) that answer the following questions and supplement the oral briefing.

Official CIA responses to these questions are requested. Please identify personal views as such.

* * * * *

I. What is the CIA's assessment of the threat to the US posed by low intensity warfare?

1) In what countries does there exist a LIC threat to US interests as a result of problems such as the following:

- * terrorism;
- * domestic instability short of insurgency or civil war, including sabotage, espionage, subversion, and hostile intelligence services;
- * insurgency or civil war;
- * regional war, intervention, or cross border operations;
- ✓ * production, possession, or employment of chemical weapons;
- * production, possession, or employment of nuclear weapons;
- * possession, production, or employment of destabilizing conventional weapons;
- * drug trafficking;
- * denial of US base rights or transit access;
- * the existence of Soviet bases or military personnel, or
- * other?

2) What countries pose a LIC threat to US interests as a result of their activities to support or sponsor activities such as those listed in question 1?

3) What threats identified above are the most serious or likely to become worse?

4) In what countries have the Soviet Union, its proxies, or other external sponsors -- as opposed to indigenous social, economic, or political problems -- been the fundamental cause

of terrorism, civil unrest, insurgency, civil war, or other LIC threats?

5) What is the LIC threat to US interests posed by arms transfers from the following: the US; other NATO countries; other western suppliers; the USSR; other Warsaw Pact countries; other Soviet bloc suppliers; other third world suppliers and producers, and the gray arms market.

6) What has been, and is expected to be, the impact of General Secretary Gorbachev's leadership on Soviet policies relating to LIC and on the extent and nature of the LIC threat?

II. For what elements of the threat does the CIA see the need for a weapons technology response?

1) For what LIC threats is a weapons technology response most appropriate? Least Appropriate?

2) What are the appropriate technological responses for those LIC threats?

III. In your view, what are the changes that have occurred in the level of weapons technology available to meet the threat, and what predictions would you make about the future?

1) What changes have occurred in the recent past in the level and types of technology and in the types of weapons available to the LIC threat?

2) What is anticipated in the foreseeable future?

IV. What weapons, weapons technologies, environments, and missions do you feel US forces are most likely to have to face?

1) What LIC situations in what countries are the most likely to require the use of US Armed Forces in combat?

2) What roles and missions are the most likely in the employment of US Armed Forces in combat in LIC?

3) What types of climates and other environments (eg.s presence of disease, absence of potable water, strong or weak air defenses) are the most likely for US Armed Forces to be operating in when engaged in LIC combat?

4) What US weapons are the most likely to be employed in an armed US response to LIC threats?

5) What is the duration and intensity of the combat that US Armed Forces are likely to meet in dealing with LIC threats?

V. What do you see as needed requirements to meet the threat?
What types of intelligence are needed?

1) What is the CIA view on the political and military lessons learned from the recent past from Desert One, Grenada, Beirut, Gulf of Sidra, and Persian Gulf, specifically regarding -

- weapons technology threats,
- appropriate US weapons technology responses,
- the effectiveness of US combat actions to meet LIC threats,
- intelligence needs?

2. Of the weapons programs that US Armed Forces require in order to be prepared to meet the various LIC threats, which are on hand? Which are not? Which of these are the most urgent requirements?

3) How do US LIC weapons requirements differ with those for high intensity warfare?

4) Other than weapons requirements, what other requirements, such as training or intelligence assets, have not yet been met?

VI. What in your view are the elements (technological and/or non-technological) of a successful strategy for meeting the threat?

1) Some have advocated an approach called "competitive strategies" to meet the military threat of the Soviet Union. Is "competitive strategies" also seen as an appropriate strategy to meet the LIC threat? If so, what are the technologies being proposed? If not, why not?

2) What is the appropriate role of weapons technology for a successful US strategy to deal with LIC threats?

3) What other elements are needed for an appropriate US strategy to deal with LIC threats?

Document Requests

(The following are requested at the secret level of classification, or below.)

1) Does CIA produce a low intensity conflict (LIC) threat assessment document analogous to the LIC portions of DIA's Joint Intelligence Estimate for Planning? If such a CIA document exists, a copy of it is requested.

2) Has the CIA produced any studies on the combat operations of US Armed Forces or on the political, military, or economic after-effects of the following (if so, please provide):

- * Desert One (1980);
- * Grenada (1983);
- * Lebanon deployment and operations (1983);
- * Gulf of Sidra (1986);
- * Persian Gulf deployment and operations (1987-1988).

3) Has the CIA produced any studies on the compromise of US weapons technology resulting from US arms transfers to friendly governments or groups (eg. Vietnam, Iran, Afghanistan insurgents). If so, please provide.

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ROOM B-373
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

May 26, 1988

Honorable Charles A. Bowsher
Comptroller General
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548


Dear General:

Congress has enacted significant legislation over time to assist the effectiveness of our national response to other than conventional warfare threat. The most recent example is Section 1311 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1987 regarding special operations forces. However, DOD's implementation of this legislation has remained somewhat controversial, and I believe an objective analysis of the contemporary threat we face is required in order to assess the need for further action.

Consequently, I am requesting that GAO study the nature of low intensity warfare, as faced by U.S. Armed Forces in recent times. Specifically, I would appreciate GAO's response to the following questions:

- o What are the low intensity warfare threats and contingencies the U.S. Armed Forces face?
- o What are the requirements for fighting low intensity warfare?
- o How do intensity warfare requirements differ from those of conventional war, and what differences are there in the use of technology and in other factors, such as manpower, strategy and tactics, organization, and equipment and support services?
- o What lessons have been learned in the recent past?
- o What elements are needed as a part of a U.S. strategy for successfully meeting low intensity warfare threats?
- o What is the general view of low intensity warfare in the Defense Department and elsewhere?

Your assignment of this project to your Program Evaluation and Methodology Division would be most appreciated.

Sincerely,


JACK BROOKS
Chairman



United States
General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

National Security and
International Affairs Division

July 27, 1988

The Honorable Frank C. Carlucci
The Secretary of Defense

Attention: DOD Office of the Inspector General
Deputy Assistant Inspector General
for GAO Report Analysis

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This is to advise you that the Program Evaluation and Methodology Division of the U.S. General Accounting Office is beginning a study entitled "Low Intensity Warfare" under assignment code 973260. This study is in response to a request from the House Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the Committee on Government Operations.

The objective of the study is to assess the nature of low intensity warfare as faced by the United States in recent times. The study will focus on what the threats are, requirements for fighting it, elements of success, lessons learned and how DOD and others view this form of conflict.

We will begin contacting OSD and service officials soon. The U.S. Special Operations Command will be one of the relevant DOD agencies and organizations we would like to visit in order to conduct our study.

If you have any questions regarding this work, please contact Kwai-Cheung Chan, Project Director, at 275-6161, or Winslow Wheeler, Project Manager, at 275-1552. Copies of this letter are being sent to the military services.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Frank C. Conahan".

Frank C. Conahan
Assistant Comptroller General

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